75 ideas
| 224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
| 232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
| 8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
| 16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
| 13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
| 14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
| 16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
| 15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
| 21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
| 221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
| 223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
| 227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
| 228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
| 210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
| 220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
| 211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
| 219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
| 16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
| 212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
| 216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
| 215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
| 213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
| 218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
| 214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
| 217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
| 15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
| 15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
| 15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
| 15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
| 13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
| 15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
| 16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
| 15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
| 16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
| 18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
| 16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
| 16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
| 16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
| 16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
| 16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
| 16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
| 16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
| 16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
| 16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
| 16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
| 16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
| 16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
| 16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
| 16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
| 16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
| 16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
| 16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
| 16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
| 16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
| 16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
| 16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
| 16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
| 16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
| 16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
| 16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
| 16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
| 16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
| 16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
| 16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
| 222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
| 225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
| 231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
| 2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
| 233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
| 234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |