54 ideas
| 291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
| 8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
| 16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
| 16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
| 16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
| 16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
| 8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
| 8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
| 8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
| 8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
| 10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
| 8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
| 8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
| 8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
| 8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
| 15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
| 15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
| 7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
| 8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
| 18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
| 8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
| 14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
| 15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
| 8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
| 8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
| 21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
| 8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
| 8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
| 8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
| 16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
| 16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
| 16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
| 16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
| 16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
| 16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
| 16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
| 16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
| 16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
| 16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
| 16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
| 16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
| 8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
| 16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
| 16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
| 8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
| 8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
| 293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |
| 8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
| 8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
| 15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
| 8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
| 8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
| 16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |