Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Letter to Frege 29.12.1899' and 'Truthmakers'

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]