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All the ideas for 'Laches', 'Philosophy of Mathematics' and 'The Republic'

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141 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Philosophers become as divine and orderly as possible, by studying divinity and order [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
The winds of the discussion should decide its destination [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is the only method of inquiry which uproots the things which it takes for granted [Plato]
The ability to take an overview is the distinguishing mark of a dialectician [Plato]
For Plato, rationality is a vision of and love of a cosmic rational order [Plato, by Taylor,C]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
You must never go against what you actually believe [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
People often merely practice eristic instead of dialectic, because they don't analyse the subject-matter [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
In mathematics certain things have to be accepted without further explanation [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock]
The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry can lead the mind upwards to truth and philosophy [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock]
ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock]
The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock]
Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock]
There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock]
Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We aim for elevated discussion of pure numbers, not attaching them to physical objects [Plato]
In pure numbers, all ones are equal, with no internal parts [Plato]
Geometry is not an activity, but the study of unchanging knowledge [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock]
Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock]
Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock]
Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock]
Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock]
A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock]
Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock]
Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock]
If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock]
If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock]
The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock]
The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
To become rational, philosophers must rise from becoming into being [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being depends on the Good, which is not itself being, but superior to being [Plato]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The best things (gods, healthy bodies, good souls) are least liable to change [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Plato's reality has unchanging Parmenidean forms, and Heraclitean flux [Plato, by Fogelin]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The plurality of beautiful things must belong to a single class, because they have a single particular character [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms are said to have no location in space [Plato, by Aristotle]
Forms are not universals, as they don't cover every general term [Plato, by Annas]
Craftsmen making furniture refer to the form, but no one manufactures the form of furniture [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Plato mistakenly thought forms were totally abstracted away from matter [Bacon on Plato]
Plato's Forms not only do not come from the senses, but they are beyond possibility of sensing [Plato, by Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge must be of the permanent unchanging nature of things [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
If theory and practice conflict, the best part of the mind accepts theory, so the other part is of lower grade [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Psychic conflict is clear if appetite is close to the body and reason fairly separate [Plato, by Modrak]
There is a third element to the mind - spirit - lying between reason and appetite [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The mind has parts, because we have inner conflicts [Plato]
The soul seems to have an infinity of parts [Aristotle on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
The 'Republic' is a great work of rhetorical theory [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
For Plato and Aristotle there is no will; there is only rational desire for what is seen as good [Plato, by Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
We avoid evil either through a natural aversion, or because we have acquired knowledge [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Without the surface decoration, poetry shows only appearances and nothing of what is real [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
Representation is two steps removed from the truth [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Artists should be excluded from a law-abiding community, because they destroy the rational mind [Plato]
Truth is closely related to proportion [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
I suggest that we forget about trying to define goodness itself for the time being [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good cannot be expressed in words, but imprints itself upon the soul [Plato, by Celsus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Plato found that he could only enforce rational moral justification by creating an authoritarian society [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value [Nietzsche on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A thing's function is what it alone can do, or what it does better than other things [Plato]
If something has a function then it has a state of being good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Goodness is mental health, badness is mental sickness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
If we were invisible, would the just man become like the unjust? [Plato]
Clever criminals do well at first, but not in the long run [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The main aim is to understand goodness, which gives everything its value and advantage [Plato]
Every person, and every activity, aims at the good [Plato]
Good has the same role in the world of knowledge as the sun has in the physical world [Plato]
The sight of goodness leads to all that is fine and true and right [Plato]
For Plato we abandon honour and pleasure once we see the Good [Plato, by Taylor,C]
Goodness makes truth and knowledge possible [Plato]
Bad is always destructive, where good preserves and benefits [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Pleasure is commonly thought to be the good, though the more ingenious prefer knowledge [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Even people who think pleasure is the good admit that there are bad pleasures [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Nice smells are intensive, have no preceding pain, and no bad after-effect [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Philosophers are concerned with totally non-physical pleasures [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
There are three types of pleasure, for reason, for spirit and for appetite [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Pleasure-seekers desperately seek illusory satisfaction, like filling a leaky vessel [Plato]
Excessive pleasure deranges people, making the other virtues impossible [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
We should behave well even if invisible, for the health of the mind [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Isn't it better to have a reputation for goodness than to actually be good? [Plato]
Morality is a compromise, showing restraint, to avoid suffering wrong without compensation [Plato]
Justice is merely the interests of the stronger party [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Surely you don't return a borrowed weapon to a mad friend? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Is right just the interests of the powerful? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Sin first, then sacrifice to the gods from the proceeds [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
For Plato, virtue is its own reward [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
True goodness requires mental unity and harmony [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
A good community necessarily has wisdom, courage, self-discipline and morality [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
If the parts of our soul do their correct work, we will be just people, and will act justly [Plato]
Simonides said morality is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
People need society because the individual has too many needs [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
All exchanges in a community are for mutual benefit [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
After a taste of mutual harm, men make a legal contract to avoid it [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
People doing their jobs properly is the fourth cardinal virtue for a city [Plato]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Reluctant rulers make a better and more unified administration [Plato]
Only rule by philosophers of integrity can keep a community healthy [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Is there anything better for a community than to produce excellent people? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Dialectic is the highest and most important part of the curriculum [Plato]
To gain knowledge, turn away from the world of change, and focus on true goodness [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Compulsory intellectual work never remains in the mind [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
If Plato's God is immaterial, he will lack consciousness, wisdom, pleasure and movement, which are essential to him [Cicero on Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
If the gods are non-existent or indifferent, why bother to deceive them? [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Something is unlikely to be immortal if it is imperfectly made from diverse parts [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Is the supreme reward for virtue to be drunk for eternity? [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
God is responsible for the good things, but we must look elsewhere for the cause of the bad things [Plato]