Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Schopenhauer' and 'The Mind in Nature'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


59 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
We become objective when we detach ourselves from the world [Janaway]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB]
'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]