Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value' and 'Four Dimensionalism'

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider]
Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider]
4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider]
4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider]
Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider]
Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider]
How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider]
Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider]
The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato]