35 ideas
| 291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
| 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
| 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
| 10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
| 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
| 10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
| 10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
| 10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
| 10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
| 10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
| 10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
| 10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
| 10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
| 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
| 10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
| 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
| 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
| 10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
| 10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
| 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
| 10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
| 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
| 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
| 10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
| 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
| 293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |
| 10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
| 10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |