Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theaetetus', 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' and 'Phaedrus'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


89 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato]
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The soul is self-motion [Plato]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato]
'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]