99 ideas
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| 24084 | Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche] |
| 192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
| 24092 | I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche] |
| 24114 | The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche] |
| 24104 | We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche] |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| 24112 | To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche] |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| 190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| 24089 | Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche] |
| 20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
| 20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
| 24115 | There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche] |
| 24090 | Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche] |
| 191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
| 24099 | We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche] |
| 24102 | Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche] |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 24120 | Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche] |
| 24097 | The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche] |
| 24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 24105 | Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche] |
| 24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche] |
| 24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche] |
| 203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
| 24087 | People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche] |
| 24091 | The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche] |
| 24093 | We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche] |
| 24121 | Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche] |
| 24107 | Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche] |
| 24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
| 24101 | We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche] |
| 202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
| 24094 | Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche] |
| 193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
| 24111 | Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche] |
| 197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
| 200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
| 24109 | Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche] |
| 188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
| 204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| 189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
| 24110 | Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche] |
| 24103 | You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche] |
| 24106 | Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche] |
| 24086 | The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche] |
| 24123 | My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche] |
| 24088 | See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche] |
| 24119 | The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche] |
| 24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche] |
| 24098 | Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche] |
| 24118 | Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche] |
| 24100 | If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche] |
| 24095 | Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche] |
| 24096 | Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche] |
| 24122 | Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche] |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |