Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Gorgias', 'Morality and the emotions' and 'Realistic Rationalism'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato]
We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato]
Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
All activity aims at the good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato]
Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato]
In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato]
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato]
Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato]
Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato]