Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lysis', 'Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason' and 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is beautiful [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato]