85 ideas
1922 | Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato] |
6891 | Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner] |
6310 | Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine] |
23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine] |
11259 | How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato] |
17905 | Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine] |
9556 | Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine] |
16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine] |
15723 | Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine] |
15490 | Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB] |
5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
8504 | Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt] |
8464 | Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine] |
7924 | The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine] |
8482 | Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine] |
12136 | Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine] |
17594 | We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine] |
15725 | Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine] |
15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine] |
15719 | We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine] |
15721 | Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine] |
15724 | Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine] |
15720 | What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine] |
22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
20219 | True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato] |
5985 | Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato] |
5986 | The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato] |
1923 | As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato] |
1919 | You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato] |
4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey] |
22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
3988 | Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine] |
6311 | The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine] |
6312 | We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine] |
6313 | Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine] |
6317 | Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine] |
6315 | We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine] |
6314 | Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine] |
23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato] |
1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato] |
1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato] |
5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
1916 | Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato] |
1918 | How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato] |
23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |