Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cratylus', 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making' and 'The Nature of Necessity'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Even the gods love play [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]