12 ideas
| 13966 | Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames] |
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 13974 | If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 13969 | Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames] |
| 3016 | Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
| 13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 13972 | Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames] |