50 ideas
| 3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
| 3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
| 16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
| 11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
| 3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
| 16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
| 3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
| 3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
| 16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
| 16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
| 16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
| 16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
| 16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
| 16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
| 16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
| 16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
| 16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
| 3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
| 16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
| 3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
| 3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
| 9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
| 3016 | Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
| 3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
| 3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
| 3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
| 3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
| 3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
| 3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
| 3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
| 3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
| 3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
| 3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
| 3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
| 16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
| 16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
| 16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
| 16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
| 16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
| 16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
| 3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
| 3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
| 3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
| 3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
| 3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
| 3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
| 3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |