Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'reports', 'A Tour through Mathematical Logic' and 'Posterior Analytics'

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92 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'tautology' must include connectives [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Deduction Theorem: T∪{P}|-Q, then T|-(P→Q), which justifies Conditional Proof [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
Universal Specification: ∀xP(x) implies P(t). True for all? Then true for an instance [Wolf,RS]
Universal Generalization: If we prove P(x) with no special assumptions, we can conclude ∀xP(x) [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): if we can say P(t), then we can say something is P [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / e. Axiom of the Empty Set IV
Empty Set: ∃x∀y ¬(y∈x). The unique empty set exists [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
Comprehension Axiom: if a collection is clearly specified, it is a set [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
In first-order logic syntactic and semantic consequence (|- and |=) nicely coincide [Wolf,RS]
First-order logic is weakly complete (valid sentences are provable); we can't prove every sentence or its negation [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory uses sets to show that mathematical deduction fits mathematical truth [Wolf,RS]
Model theory reveals the structures of mathematics [Wolf,RS]
Model theory 'structures' have a 'universe', some 'relations', some 'functions', and some 'constants' [Wolf,RS]
First-order model theory rests on completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An 'isomorphism' is a bijection that preserves all structural components [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
The LST Theorem is a serious limitation of first-order logic [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
If a theory is complete, only a more powerful language can strengthen it [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Most deductive logic (unlike ordinary reasoning) is 'monotonic' - we don't retract after new givens [Wolf,RS]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
An ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings, or a transitive set whose members are transitive [Wolf,RS]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Modern mathematics has unified all of its objects within set theory [Wolf,RS]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt]
'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt]
The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle]
Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle]
We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle]
Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle]
There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle]
Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle]
We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle]
Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle]
Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle]
Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle]
Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle]
Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle]
All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle]
Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle]
Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle]
A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle]
What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle]
A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle]