Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'reports', 'Truth (2nd edn)' and 'Reference and Essence (1st edn)'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]