Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'reports', 'Db (ideas)' and 'Naturalizing the Mind'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
4465 Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
4686 Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
7415 Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
7414 What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
6696 The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4687 Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6516 Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
3016 Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
24054 Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
5806 Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
5801 A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
3875 If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3876 If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
5802 Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
5809 Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5808 Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5803 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
5807 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
5805 Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5804 A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
5800 All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7734 Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
7735 Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
3877 Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
6126 Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
3873 An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]
3874 How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]