Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'reports', 'The Logic of What Might Have Been' and 'Writing the Book of the World'

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77 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider]
Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider]
Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider]
'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / b. Types of fundamental
Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider]
Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider]
Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider]
Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider]
Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider]