146 ideas
| 21979 | Wisdom emerges at the end of a process [Hegel] |
| 22766 | Philosophy is exploration of the rational [Hegel] |
| 14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
| 14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
| 14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
| 22768 | Subjective and objective are not firmly opposed, but merge into one another [Hegel] |
| 14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
| 14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
| 14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
| 18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
| 14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
| 14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
| 14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
| 15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
| 14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
| 14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
| 14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
| 14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
| 14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
| 14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
| 18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
| 14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
| 14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
| 14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
| 15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
| 14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
| 14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
| 14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
| 14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
| 18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
| 14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
| 14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
| 14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
| 14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
| 14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
| 14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
| 14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
| 14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
| 14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
| 14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
| 14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
| 14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
| 14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
| 14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
| 14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
| 14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
| 14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
| 14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
| 7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
| 18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
| 14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
| 14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
| 14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
| 9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
| 14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
| 14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
| 21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
| 18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
| 11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
| 14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
| 22772 | Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel] |
| 14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
| 14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
| 21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
| 10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
| 10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
| 7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
| 14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
| 14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
| 14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
| 14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
| 14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
| 11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 3016 | Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
| 22780 | It is a rejection of intellectual dignity to say that we cannot know the truth [Hegel] |
| 22770 | A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel] |
| 22788 | A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel] |
| 22792 | Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel] |
| 21780 | A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
| 10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
| 10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
| 14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
| 19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
| 14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
| 19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
| 22769 | The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel] |
| 21787 | Evil enters a good will when we believe we are doing right, but allow no criticism of our choice [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21786 | Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel] |
| 22784 | Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel] |
| 8029 | You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre] |
| 22771 | Be a person, and respect other persons [Hegel] |
| 22051 | The categorical imperative lacks roots in a historical culture [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 22781 | The categorical imperative is fine if you already have a set of moral principles [Hegel] |
| 22779 | The good is realised freedom [Hegel] |
| 22787 | The family is the first basis of the state, but estates are a necessary second [Hegel] |
| 22790 | We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel] |
| 22767 | I aim to portray the state as a rational entity [Hegel] |
| 22789 | Society draws people, and requires their work, making them wholly dependent on it [Hegel] |
| 22791 | The state is the march of God in the world [Hegel] |
| 22778 | Individuals can't leave the state, because they are natural citizens, and humans require a state [Hegel] |
| 22794 | A fully developed state is conscious and knows what it wills [Hegel] |
| 22799 | The people do not have the ability to know the general will [Hegel] |
| 22801 | The great man of the ages is the one who reveals and accomplishes the will of his time [Hegel] |
| 22796 | A constitution embodies a nation's rights and condition [Hegel] |
| 22777 | Individuals must dedicate themselves to the ethical whole, and give their lives when asked [Hegel] |
| 21791 | Social groups must focus on the state, which must in turn respect their inclusion and their will [Hegel] |
| 22795 | People can achieve respect for their state by insight into its essence [Hegel] |
| 21988 | In the 1840s Hegel seemed to defend society being right as it is, as a manifestation of Mind [Hegel, by Singer] |
| 22800 | Majority rule means obligations can be imposed on me [Hegel] |
| 21792 | The state should reflect all interests, and not just popular will, or a popular party [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22797 | In modern states an individual's actions should be their choice [Hegel] |
| 21790 | Moral individuals become ethical when they see the social aspect of a matter [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 8030 | For Hegel, the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community [Hegel, by MacIntyre] |
| 22785 | Even educated women are unsuited to science, philosophy, art and government [Hegel] |
| 21789 | Slaves have no duties because they have no rights [Hegel] |
| 22776 | Slaves are partly responsible for their own condition [Hegel] |
| 21778 | True liberal freedom is to pursue something, while being free to cease the pursuit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21779 | People assume they are free, but the options available are not under their control [Hegel] |
| 22085 | Freedom requires us to submit to a family, or a corporation, or a state [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22798 | Money is the best way to achieve just equality [Hegel] |
| 22783 | Rights imply duties, and duties imply rights [Hegel] |
| 21782 | Man has an absolute right to appropriate things [Hegel] |
| 22773 | Because only human beings can own property, everything else can become our property [Hegel] |
| 22774 | A community does not have the property-owning rights that a person has [Hegel] |
| 22775 | The owner of a thing is obviously the first person to freely take possession of it [Hegel] |
| 22802 | Wars add strength to a nation, and cure internal dissension [Hegel] |
| 22786 | Children need discipline, to break their self-will and eradicate sensuousness [Hegel] |
| 14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
| 14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
| 14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
| 14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
| 14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
| 14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
| 14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
| 14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
| 22782 | To have pagan beliefs and be a pagan are quite different [Hegel] |
| 22793 | Some religions lead to harsh servitude and the debasement of human beings [Hegel] |