Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'reports', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'How Things Might Have Been'

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28 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
3016 Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]