37 ideas
| 3016 | Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 21202 | The strong force has a considerably greater range than the weak force [Martin,BR] |
| 21211 | If an expected reaction does not occur, that implies a conservation law [Martin,BR] |
| 21209 | Electron emit and reabsorb photons, which create and reabsorb virtual electrons and positrons [Martin,BR] |
| 21201 | A 'field' is just a region to which points can be assigned in space and time [Martin,BR] |
| 21212 | The Higgs field, unlike others, has a nozero value in a state without particles [Martin,BR] |
| 21205 | Many physicists believe particles have further structure, if only we could see it [Martin,BR] |
| 21203 | Uncertainty allows very brief violations of energy conservation - even shorter with higher energies [Martin,BR] |
| 21207 | The Exclusion Principle says no two fermions occupy the same state, with the same numbers [Martin,BR] |
| 21204 | The standard model combines theories of strong interaction, and electromagnetic and weak interaction [Martin,BR] |
| 21208 | Eletrons don't literally 'spin', because they are point-like [Martin,BR] |
| 21210 | Virtual particles surround any charged particle [Martin,BR] |
| 21206 | The properties of a particle are determined by its quantum numbers and its mass [Martin,BR] |
| 21213 | String theory only has one free parameter (tension) - unlike the standard model with 19 [Martin,BR] |
| 21200 | An 'element' is what cannot be decomposed by chemistry [Martin,BR] |