16 ideas
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |