45 ideas
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |