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All the ideas for 'poems', 'Truthmakers' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
12667 Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18486 We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18484 Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18466 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18473 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
18481 Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18483 The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18479 There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
18477 There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
18482 Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18474 Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
18485 Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
18490 Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
18493 Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
12666 We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18489 Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18476 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
12688 Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18480 Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
12683 Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
12670 A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
18471 Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
18472 Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
18475 Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
12673 Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
12665 I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
12682 Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
12684 Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
12672 Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
12676 Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
23781 Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
12686 Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
12685 Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12679 A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
12668 Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18478 Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12687 Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
12669 Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
6017 Nomos is king [Pindar]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
12681 There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
12680 Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
12675 Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12671 I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
12674 Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
12689 Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
12690 The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]