Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'poems', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
1848 We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
1858 The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
1852 For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
1860 Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
1855 If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
1861 The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
1862 However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
1853 Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
1856 Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
1849 Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
1854 We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
1857 We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
1847 The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
1846 The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
1850 Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
6017 Nomos is king [Pindar]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
1851 Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
1859 Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]