14 ideas
| 12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
| 10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
| 10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
| 10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
| 23551 | It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M] |
| 23558 | Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M] |
| 23550 | Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M] |
| 23552 | We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M] |
| 23553 | Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M] |
| 23555 | Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M] |
| 23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |
| 22511 | Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus] |
| 23557 | To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M] |