Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Limits of Reason' and 'Essential Attribution'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18696 The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
18701 The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18694 Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18692 Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
18693 Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
18695 An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11187 In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
18700 Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
18698 Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18697 A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
22511 Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]