78 ideas
| 16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
| 16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
| 15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
| 19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
| 15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
| 18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
| 15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
| 2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
| 10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
| 10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
| 17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
| 10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
| 15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
| 18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
| 10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
| 14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
| 14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
| 14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
| 14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
| 14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
| 14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
| 14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
| 14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
| 14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
| 14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
| 14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
| 14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
| 14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
| 14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
| 14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
| 14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
| 14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
| 14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
| 14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
| 14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
| 14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
| 14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
| 14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
| 14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
| 14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
| 14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
| 14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
| 14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
| 14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
| 14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
| 14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
| 14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
| 14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
| 14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
| 22511 | Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus] |
| 20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
| 14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
| 14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
| 14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
| 14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
| 14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
| 14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
| 14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |