26 ideas
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
22511 | Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus] |