18 ideas
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 22511 | Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus] |
| 21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
| 21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
| 21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
| 21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
| 21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
| 21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
| 21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
| 21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
| 22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |