15 ideas
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
13931 | By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger] |
13925 | Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger] |
13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |
13927 | We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger] |
13928 | If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
22511 | Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus] |