Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Metaphysics: the logical approach' and 'On Interpretation'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
3358 Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
3312 There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
3352 Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3329 Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
1708 In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
1703 It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
1704 Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
22272 Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
9405 Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
9728 Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9729 Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9730 Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9731 Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9732 Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9733 Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
3326 Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA]
3327 The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
3335 The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
21593 In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
1701 A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
3332 Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
3330 Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA]
3337 Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
1706 Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
1707 Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
3310 If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12793 Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
3353 If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
3304 Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
3350 Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
3309 If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
3351 One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
3314 Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
3323 Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
3306 The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3349 If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA]
3341 Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA]
3344 Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA]
3345 Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
2337 For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13763 Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
1705 It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
22745 Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
3334 Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
1702 Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
3308 In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
5883 Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero]