76 ideas
1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
1502 | Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides] |
1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
448 | No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides] |
447 | Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides] |
449 | Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides] |
1503 | There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides] |
445 | The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides] |
21820 | Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus] |
452 | All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides] |
19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
1504 | Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
444 | The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides] |
12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
450 | Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides] |
15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
451 | Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides] |
9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
1506 | Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides] |
3058 | Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides] |
1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
555 | People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
5081 | There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
1509 | The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius] |
20900 | Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle] |
226 | The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides] |
1505 | Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
453 | Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides] |
1792 | He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |
5115 | It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
13217 | The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle] |
22918 | What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides] |
1794 | He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |
1791 | He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |