Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Word and Object' and 'The Definition of Good'

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57 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides]
The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine]
The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]
Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine]
The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine]
We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine]
Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine]
Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine]
Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides]
There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides]
The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius]
Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides]
Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides]
Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]