48 ideas
| 1502 | Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides] |
| 18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
| 18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
| 18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
| 18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
| 18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
| 18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
| 18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
| 18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
| 18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
| 18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
| 18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
| 18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
| 18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
| 448 | No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides] |
| 447 | Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides] |
| 449 | Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides] |
| 1503 | There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides] |
| 445 | The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides] |
| 21820 | Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus] |
| 18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
| 452 | All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides] |
| 18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
| 18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
| 18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
| 1504 | Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
| 444 | The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides] |
| 18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
| 450 | Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides] |
| 451 | Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides] |
| 1506 | Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides] |
| 3058 | Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides] |
| 5081 | There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
| 1509 | The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius] |
| 20900 | Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle] |
| 226 | The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides] |
| 1505 | Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
| 453 | Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides] |
| 555 | People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
| 1792 | He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5115 | It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
| 13217 | The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle] |
| 22918 | What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides] |
| 7489 | Joshua said, Sun, stand thou still [Anon (Josh)] |
| 1791 | He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1794 | He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |