Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind' and 'A Defense of Presentism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
We can have a series with identical members [Tait]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait]
Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait]
If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]