18 ideas
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |