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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'fragments/reports' and 'Category Mistakes'

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143 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men participate in politics, especially if it shows moral progress [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
Wise men are never astonished at things which other people take to be wonders [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
No wise man has yet been discovered [Stoic school, by Cicero]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Stoic physics concerns cosmos, elements and causes (with six detailed divisions) [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Ethics studies impulse, good, passion, virtue, goals, value, action, appropriateness, encouragement [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
True philosophising is not memorising ideas, but living by them [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
Some facts are indispensable for an effect, and others actually necessitate the effect [Stoic school, by Cicero]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Stoics study canons, criteria and definitions, in order to find the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Stoics believed that rational capacity in man (logos) is embodied in the universe [Stoic school, by Long]
The Stoics distinguished spoken logos from logos within the mind [Stoic school, by Plotinus]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectics is mastery of question and answer form [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor]
Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor]
Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor]
Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor]
The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor]
Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor]
A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor]
If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor]
Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor]
If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / d. Category mistake as pragmatic
Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor]
In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor]
Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor]
'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor]
Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / e. Category mistake as ontological
The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Falsehoods corrupt a mind, producing passions and instability [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
The truth bearers are said to be the signified, or the signifier, or the meaning of the signifier [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Stoics like syllogisms, for showing what is demonstrative, which corrects opinions [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Stoics avoided universals by paraphrasing 'Man is...' as 'If something is a man, then it is...' [Stoic school, by Long]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
The contradictory of a contradictory is an affirmation [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
Stoics applied bivalence to sorites situations, so everyone is either vicious or wholly virtuous [Stoic school, by Williamson]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics have four primary categories: substrates, qualities, dispositions, relative dispositions [Stoic school, by Simplicius]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Platonic Forms are just our thoughts [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Stoics say matter has qualities, and substance underlies it, with no form or qualities [Stoic school, by Chalcidius]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
How is divisibility possible, if stoics say things remain united when they are divided? [Alexander on Stoic school]
How is separateness possible, if separated things are always said to be united? [Alexander on Stoic school]
Stoics say wholes are more than parts, but entirely consist of parts [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
A proposition is possible if it is true when nothing stops it being true [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Conditionals are false if the falsehood of the conclusion does not conflict with the antecedent [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is a secure grasp of presentations which cannot be reversed by argument [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Two sorts of opinion: either poorly grounded belief, or weak belief [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
There are non-sensible presentations, which come to us through the intellect [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
Stoics say we are born like a blank sheet of paper; the first concepts on it are sensations [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
At birth the soul is a blank sheet ready to be written on [Stoic school, by Aetius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Non-graspable presentations are from what doesn't exist, or are not clear and distinct [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Stoic perception is a presentation to which one voluntarily assents [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All our concepts come from experience, directly, or by expansion, reduction or compounding [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Dialectic is a virtue which contains other virtues [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
For Stoics knowledge is an assertion which never deviates from the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Demonstration derives what is less clear from what is clear [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The Stoics think that soul in the narrow sense is nothing but reason [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Eight parts of the soul: five senses, seeds, speech and reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Division of the soul divides a person, reducing responsibility for the nonrational part [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
Stoics say the soul is a mixture of air and fire [Stoic school, by Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our conceptions arise from experience, similarity, analogy, transposition, composition and opposition [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
For Stoics the true self is defined by what I can be master of [Stoic school, by Foucault]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Stoics expanded the idea of compulsion, and contracted what counts as one's own actions [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The free will problem was invented by the Stoics [Stoic school, by Berlin]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The nearest to ancient determinism is Stoic fate, but that is controlled by a sympathetic God [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Stoics classify passions according to the opinion of good and bad which they imply [Stoic school, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
There are four basic emotions: pleasure or delight, distress, appetite, and fear [Stoic school, by Cicero]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Stoics said that correct judgement needs an invincible criterion of truth [Stoic school, by Fogelin]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are intellectual phantasms [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor]
'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are incomplete 'lekta' [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor]
Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor]
Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric has three types, four modes, and four sections [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor]
In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor]
The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / c. Presupposition
A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor]
A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor]
The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor]
If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor]
Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor]
Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor]
Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor]
One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor]
Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor]
The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor]
Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor]
Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Earlier Stoics speak of assent, but not of choice, let alone of a will [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Stoics said responsibility depends on rationality [Stoic school, by Sorabji]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics use 'kalon' (beautiful) as a synonym for 'agathon' (good) [Bury on Stoic school]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Stoics say that folly alone is evil [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Prime values apply to the life in agreement; useful values apply to the natural life [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
The appraiser's value is what is set by someone experienced in the facts [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The goal is to live consistently with the constitution of a human being [Stoic school, by Clement]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Stoics said health is an 'indifferent', but they still considered it preferable [Stoic school, by Pormann]
The health of the soul is a good blend of beliefs [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Stoic morality says that one's own happiness will lead to impartiality [Stoic school, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Virtuous men do not feel sexual desire, which merely focuses on physical beauty [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Stoicism was an elitist option to lead a beautiful life [Stoic school, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Final goods: confidence, prudence, freedom, enjoyment and no pain, good spirits, virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness for the Stoics was an equable flow of life [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is the end and goal, achieved by living virtuously, in agreement, and according to nature [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Stoics say pleasure is at most a byproduct of finding what is suitable for us [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Rapture is a breakdown of virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
If humans are citizens of the world (not just a state) then virtue is all good human habits [Stoic school, by Mautner]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
An appropriate action is one that can be defended, perhaps by its consistency. [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour is just, courageous, orderly or knowledgeable. It is praiseworthy, or functions well [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
The Stoics rejected entirely the high value that had been placed on contemplation [Stoic school, by Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Stoics do not despise external goods, but subject them to reason, and not to desire [Taylor,R on Stoic school]
Crafts like music and letters are virtuous conditions, and they accord with virtue [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
For Stoics, obligations are determined by social role [Taylor,R on Stoic school]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is distinguished by knowing conditional truths, because impressions are connected [Stoic school, by Long]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
Stoics favour a mixture of democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
The best government blends democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
The Stoics saw the whole world as a city [Stoic school, by Long]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Stoics originated the concept of natural law, as agreed correct reasoning [Stoic school, by Annas]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Stoics say a wise man will commit suicide if he has a good enough reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Suicide is reasonable, for one's country or friends, or because of very bad health [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Stoic 'nature' is deterministic, physical and teleological [Stoic school, by Annas]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Unlike Epicurus, Stoics distinguish the Whole from the All, with the latter including the void [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The cosmos has two elements - passive matter, and active cause (or reason) which shapes it [Stoic school, by Seneca]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
The cosmos is regularly consumed and reorganised by the primary fire [Stoic school, by Aristocles]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Early Stoics called the logos 'god', meaning not a being, but the principle of the universe [Stoic school]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Stoics say god is matter, or an inseparable quality of it, or is the power within it [Stoic school, by Chalcidius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Virtuous souls endure till the end, foolish souls for a short time, animal souls not at all [Stoic school, by Eusebius]
Stoics say virtuous souls last till everything ends in fire, but foolish ones fade away [Stoic school, by ]