40 ideas
19504 | My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D] |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
19503 | An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D] |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
19505 | Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG] |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
19499 | We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D] |
19500 | Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D] |
19502 | Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D] |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
19498 | Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D] |
19506 | Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D] |
19496 | Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D] |
19497 | Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D] |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
19495 | Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D] |
19501 | We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D] |
19507 | Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D] |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |