Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)' and 'Remarks on axiomatised set theory'

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10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]