Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Problems of Knowledge' and 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge'

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39 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
3593 The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
3585 Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M]
19081 Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
3584 Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
3599 Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3591 We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
8806 The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
3582 Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
3592 Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
3579 Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
3581 Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
8252 Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8255 Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3564 Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
3595 What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
3580 Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
3578 Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3576 Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
3577 Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
3589 Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
3590 Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3571 Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
3574 Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3586 Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
3567 How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
3569 In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
3573 Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
3565 Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
3566 We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3594 Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
3575 Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
3587 Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
3588 Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
18703 Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]