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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and 'Writings from Late Notebooks'

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179 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
'Wisdom' attempts to get beyond perspectives, making it hostile to life [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein]
Words such as 'I' and 'do' and 'done to' are placed at the point where our ignorance begins [Nietzsche]
Pessimism is laughable, because the world cannot be evaluated [Nietzsche]
Is a 'philosopher' now impossible, because knowledge is too vast for an overview? [Nietzsche]
This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein]
Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein]
Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein]
The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein]
All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein]
Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic tries to understand the world according to a man-made scheme [Nietzsche]
Logic is not driven by truth, but desire for a simple single viewpoint [Nietzsche]
Logic must falsely assume that identical cases exist [Nietzsche]
Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock]
The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein]
A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein]
The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein]
If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein]
Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein]
Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can't be realists, because we don't know what being is [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein]
The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Categories are not metaphysical truths, but inventions in the service of needs [Nietzsche]
Philosophers find it particularly hard to shake off belief in necessary categories [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein]
A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Maybe there are only subjects, and 'objects' result from relations between subjects [Nietzsche]
Counting needs unities, but that doesn't mean they exist; we borrowed it from the concept of 'I' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sense perceptions contain values (useful, so pleasant) [Nietzsche]
Pain shows the value of the damage, not what has been damaged [Nietzsche]
Perception is unconscious, and we are only conscious of processed perceptions [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Comprehending everything is impossible, because it abolishes perspectives [Nietzsche]
Is the perspectival part of the essence, or just a relation between beings? [Nietzsche]
'Perspectivism': the world has no meaning, but various interpretations give it countless meanings [Nietzsche]
'Subjectivity' is an interpretation, since subjects (and interpreters) are fictions [Nietzsche]
There are different eyes, so different 'truths', so there is no truth [Nietzsche]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is just showing the succession of things ever more clearly [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The intellect and senses are a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
With protoplasm ½+½=2, so the soul is not an indivisible monad [Nietzsche]
Unity is not in the conscious 'I', but in the organism, which uses the self as a tool [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Consciousness exists to the extent that consciousness is useful [Nietzsche]
Consciousness is a 'tool' - just as the stomach is a tool [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We think each thought causes the next, unaware of the hidden struggle beneath [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The 'I' is a conceptual synthesis, not the governor of our being [Nietzsche]
The 'I' is a fiction used to make the world of becoming 'knowable' [Nietzsche]
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
'Freedom of will' is the feeling of having a dominating force [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality is a scheme we cannot cast away [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein]
Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Experiencing a thing as beautiful is to experience it wrongly [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality is a system of values which accompanies a being's life [Nietzsche]
Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Values are innate and inherited [Nietzsche]
Our values express an earlier era's conditions for survival and growth [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Knowledge, wisdom and goodness only have value relative to a goal [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Altruism is praised by the egoism of the weak, who want everyone to be looked after [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
A living being is totally 'egoistic' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Modest people express happiness as 'Not bad' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The only happiness is happiness with illusion [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure needs dissatisfaction, boundaries and resistances [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse [Nietzsche]
Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
What does not kill us makes us stronger [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
Courage, compassion, insight, solitude are the virtues, with courtesy a necessary vice [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Not feeling harnessed to a system of 'ends' is a wonderful feeling of freedom [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Nihilism results from measuring the world by our categories which are purely invented [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
By developing herd virtues man fixes what has up to now been the 'unfixed animal' [Nietzsche]
Virtues from outside are dangerous, and they should come from within [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Existence without meaning or goal or end, eternally recurring, is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is above all a judging animal [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
The upholding of the military state is needed to maintain the strong human type [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights arise out of contracts, which need a balance of power [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
'Purpose' is like the sun, where most heat is wasted, and a tiny part has 'purpose' [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Things are strong or weak, and do not behave regularly or according to rules or compulsions [Nietzsche]
Chemical 'laws' are merely the establishment of power relations between weaker and stronger [Nietzsche]
All motions and 'laws' are symptoms of inner events, traceable to the will to power [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
The utility of an organ does not explain its origin, on the contrary! [Nietzsche]
Survival might undermine an individual's value, or prevent its evolution [Nietzsche]
Darwin overestimates the influence of 'external circumstances' [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Remove goodness and wisdom from our concept of God. Being the highest power is enough! [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Morality kills religion, because a Christian-moral God is unbelievable [Nietzsche]
It is dishonest to invent a being containing our greatest values, thus ignoring why they exist and are valuable [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality can only be upheld by belief in God and a 'hereafter' [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Paganism is a form of thanking and affirming life? [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christian belief is kept alive because it is soothing - the proof based on pleasure [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
In heaven all the interesting men are missing [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
A combination of great power and goodness would mean the disastrous abolition of evil [Nietzsche]