Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' and 'A Study of Concepts'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]