Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery' and 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22358 Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22188 Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
7780 Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
16830 We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
6794 If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
6795 When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
3856 Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
7779 There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3860 Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]