54 ideas
| 10373 | Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J] |
| 12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
| 12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
| 13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
| 13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
| 12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
| 10367 | There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J] |
| 13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
| 19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
| 13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
| 12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
| 12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
| 19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
| 13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
| 13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
| 19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
| 19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
| 19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
| 19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
| 11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
| 13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| 13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
| 10359 | In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J] |
| 10372 | Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J] |
| 10374 | There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J] |
| 10366 | Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J] |
| 10377 | Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J] |
| 10378 | A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J] |
| 10382 | Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10375 | At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J] |
| 10389 | Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J] |
| 10390 | Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J] |
| 10380 | Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J] |
| 10385 | If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10388 | Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J] |
| 10387 | The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J] |
| 10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |
| 10361 | Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J] |
| 10360 | Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J] |
| 10362 | One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J] |
| 10368 | If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J] |
| 10383 | The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J] |
| 10393 | Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J] |
| 10394 | Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J] |
| 10376 | The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J] |
| 10381 | All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
| 13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
| 13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
| 13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
| 13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |