Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Rationality in Action' and 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion'

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48 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / d. Religious Experience
Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B]
A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B]
The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / b. Religious Meaning
One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B]