Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Philosophical Logic' and 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

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45 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
15413 With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15415 The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
15430 Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess]
15431 It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
15429 Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
15404 Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
15405 Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess]
15427 The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess]
15421 Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
15403 Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
15407 Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
15424 Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
15409 All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
15414 The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
15406 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
15425 The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess]
15426 We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
15408 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
15418 Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
15412 Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess]
15411 We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess]
15416 We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
15428 The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
15075 Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
15065 What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
15076 Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15073 Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15074 We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
15420 De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
15419 General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess]
15417 Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
15064 Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
15422 Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess]
15423 It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15069 Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
15068 The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15077 It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]
15067 A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15066 B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]