86 ideas
3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
19906 | All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke] |
19882 | We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke] |
19864 | In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke] |
19865 | There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke] |
19866 | The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke] |
19872 | The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke] |
19907 | There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke] |
19863 | Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke] |
5654 | The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton] |
19888 | A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke] |
6702 | If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke] |
19909 | A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke] |
19910 | A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke] |
19893 | Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke] |
19894 | You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke] |
19892 | Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke] |
19885 | Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke] |
19886 | The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke] |
19903 | Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke] |
19905 | People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke] |
19904 | Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke] |
19895 | Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke] |
19900 | The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke] |
19902 | Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke] |
19908 | Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke] |
19911 | If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke] |
19887 | Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke] |
19901 | The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke] |
19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke] |
19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke] |
19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke] |
19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke] |
19880 | All value depends on the labour involved [Locke] |
19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke] |
19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke] |
6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin] |
20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke] |
19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke] |
19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke] |
19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke] |
19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke] |
19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke] |
19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke] |
19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke] |
19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke] |
19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke] |
19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke] |
19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke] |
19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke] |
19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke] |
3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |