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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
12667 Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
12666 We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
12688 Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
12683 Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
12670 A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
12673 Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
12665 I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
12682 Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
12684 Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
12672 Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
12676 Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
23781 Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
12686 Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
12685 Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12679 A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
12668 Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12687 Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
6346 The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
6351 Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
6374 To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
6355 Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6359 Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6366 Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
6362 Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6371 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
6373 Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6353 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
6361 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
6357 Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
6363 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6365 Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6354 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
6367 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6370 Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
6358 One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6364 We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
12669 Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
6352 Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
6372 Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
6360 Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
12681 There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
12680 Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
12675 Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12671 I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
12674 Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
12689 Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
12690 The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]